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From the ‘Opt-Out’ Procedure(S)  
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Too often, legal and sociopolitical scholars concerned with European policies and 
decision-making procedures focus their efforts only on the official essence of 
conventional opt-out forms of nonparticipation in the European integration process, 
such as those established in the Treaty of Lisbon. Yet, far from being just an internal 
matter, the independentist instances which informed the Scottish referendum had a 
significant impact on delicate issues of EU law, biopolitics, political anthropology, 
political theology, and foreign policy which deserve to be properly addressed. The 
necessity of conducting such an analysis is self-evident, and mainly related to the 
possibility that the Scottish experience may be soon replicated, with different results, 
in the Italian regions of Venetia, Sardinia, and Lombardy, and in the Spanish 
community of Catalonia. Delving into this dimension through Schmitt’s political 
decisionism and adopting a comparative and interdisciplinary approach that 
transcends the limits of pure positivistic and analytical lines of inquiry, this paper 
presents a country’s choice to leave the EU or stop cooperating with it through the 
direct opt-out mechanisms officially regulated in its Treaties, or through indirect 
forms of secessionism, in terms of an ‘exceptional’ act of sovereign will. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with direct and indirect, full and partial forms of 
nonparticipation in the European integration process for those countries that 
are already part of the European Union (EU) or have withdrawn from 
previous international agreements and decided no longer to cooperate with it, 
such as Switzerland. Contrary to popular thought, EU law provides Member 
States with several ways in which to choose whether or not to participate in 
the harmonization effort. In particular, occasionally Member States may 
negotiate exclusion from certain supranational activities or policies, or 
particular areas of intervention, in order to preserve strategic pieces of 
sovereignty over issues of national interest. As will be discussed, Denmark, 
Poland, Sweden, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (UK) have all opted, in 
different contexts and using different methodological approaches, for 
conventional forms of opt-out. 
Delving into this dimension, and bearing in mind not only the results of 
the recent Swiss and Scottish referendums, but also the secessionist instances 
expressed by the Italian regions of Venetia, Sardinia, and Lombardy, and by 
the Spanish community of Catalonia, the present contribution investigates the 
possible consequence for a country of leaving the EU or ceasing to cooperate 
with it through direct and indirect, and thus “official” and “unofficial,” forms 
of opt-out. Our aim is to discuss these procedures unconventionally through 
the adoption of an approach that will transcend the limits of recursive lines of 
positivistic inquiry and reach the boundaries of political theology, biopolitics, 
and political anthropology. Attention will therefore be paid to the role of the 
Schmittian concepts of the “political” and “state of exception” as the key 
elements through which, we believe, it will be possible to uncover the socio-, 
bio- and geopolitical essence of the instances which characterize the opt-out 
phenomenon in its various presentifications. 
Our suggestion that both direct and indirect opt-out procedures cannot 
be understood fully without the analysis of Schmitt’s thought warrants a 
preliminary clarification. As Jennifer R. Rust and Julia Reinhard Lupton 
pointed out, the fact that Schmitt’s writings “have undergone a ‘renaissance’ 
in the English-speaking world”1 is anything but a coincidence and should be 
considered as the starting point of our inquiry. Schmitt was a – if not the – 
leading jurist and political theorist in Germany during the period after World 
War I. Yet he will always be remembered for his associations with the 
National Socialists (he joined the party in 1933 and then left it in 1936), the 
prelude to which was the publication, in 1921, of Die Diktatur, in which he 
argued in favour of commissarial forms of dictatorship to deal with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See their Introduction to CARL SCHMITT, HAMLET OR HECUBA xv (David Pan & 
Jennifer R Rust trans., Telos Press 2009). 
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extraordinary circumstances. Aside from his controversial attitude towards 
the Nazi Party,2 and the incessant attacks from both the academic and press 
worlds since 1934, there are two reasons for the current growing interest in 
reading Schmitt’s work: (1) the recent translation into English of his major 
works, which must be analyzed in conjunction with the translations of 
Giorgio Agamben’s works, whose theories owe their provenance to Schmitt; 
and (2) the features of the project aimed at creating an “aspatial,” unlimited, 
and unbounded global order on which the World Trade Organization, 
together with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have 
been actively working since the late 1990s and which is based on a scheme of 
intelligibility that transcends the legal, socio and geopolitical, and ontological 
presentifications of the modern nation-state. What will be expounded in the 
following pages takes the current interest in Schmitt’s thought into pivotal 
account. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section II sets the official and 
conventional perimeter of our inquiry and deals with ordinary opt-out 
procedures with the aim to provide the reader with a mere positivistic and 
notionistic overview of the relevant legislation and practical cases 
experienced thus far; building on the Scottish experience, Section III 
explores, through the same approach adopted in Section II, the essence, 
features, aims, and challenges related to any possible secessionist event 
through an independence referendum in order to verify whether, for example, 
it is possible for a new independent country to secure an agreement to join 
the EU; adopting a diametrically opposed modus investigandi, Section IV 
will provide the reader with an unconventional understanding of direct and 
indirect mechanisms of opt-out through, on the one hand, the lens of 
Schmitt’s spatial thinking and his concepts of the “political” and of a “state of 
exception,” and, on the other hand, the insight provided by biopolitics and 
political anthropology; finally, Section V will present some concluding 
remarks with the intent to combine the positivistic roadmap pursued in the 
early Sections with the unconventional method used in Section IV. 
 
II. TRADITIONAL OPT-OUTS FROM EU INTEGRATION 
In light of what will be argued in Section IV, it should be clarified from 
the very beginning that EU law contains a number of options by which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For a compelling inquiry into the relationship that Schmitt had with the Nazi Party, 
see Guy Oakes’s Introduction to CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL ROMANTICISM ix (MIT 
Press 1986); see also Joseph W. Bendersky’s Introduction to CARL SCHMITT, ON THE 
THREE TYPES OF JURIST THOUGHT 1 (Joseph W. Bendersky trans., Praeger 2004); 
Tracy B. Strong’s Foreword to CARL SCHMITT, THE LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE 
THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES: MEANING AND FAILURE OF A POLITICAL SYMBOL vii 
(George Schwab & Erna Hilfstein trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2008). 
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Member States may opt out of the integration process; whether they leave the 
Union entirely or establish certain reservations. What will be expounded in 
the following pages is aimed at contextualizing the decisions that the Member 
States have made in this regard since the establishment, in 1948, of the 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). Our argument is 
that because the EU is a “top-down” legitimizing political process rather than 
a “bottom-up” one,3 both direct and indirect opt-out procedures are nothing 
other than the exceptional scheme through which it is possible to change the 
supranational “social contract” that Member States have continued to sign 
since 1948. This, we believe, is further demonstrated by the failure of the 
constitutional project due to the French and Dutch referendums in 2005 and 
the subsequent decisions made in Lisbon. In particular, we argue that the 
instances which lay behind both referendums and all direct and indirect opt-
out measures have a common core which cannot be understood without 
addressing why – although the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union,4 which today has the same legal effect as the EU’s Treaties, 
has conferred the additional ordoliberal5 model of ‘European citizenship’6 on 
Member States citizens – the so-called “Europe of citizens”7 is far from being 
achieved. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See JULIE DICKSON & PAVLOS ELEFTHERIADIS, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2012); George Pagoulatos & Loukas 
Tsoukalis, Multilevel Governance, in ERIK JONES, ANAND MENON & STEPHEN 
WEATHERILL, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 62-75 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2012); Vivien A Schmidt, Democracy and Legitimacy in the European 
Union, in JONES, MENON & WEATHERILL, supra, at 661–75; Adrienne Héritier, 
Policy Effectiveness and Transparency in European Policy Making, in JONES, 
MENON & WEATHERILL, supra, at 676–689;, POLICY-MAKING AND DIVERSITY IN 
EUROPE (Cambridge Univ. Press UP 1999); New Modes of Governance in Europe: 
Increasing Political Capacity and Policy Effectiveness? in THE STATE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 105–26 (Tanja A. Börzel, Rachel A. Cichowski eds., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2003); New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy-Making Without 
Legislating? in COMMON GOODS: REINVENTING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
GOVERNANCE 185–207 (Adrienne Héritier ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
2002); Adrienne Héritier, Dirk Lehmkuhl, The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes 
of Governance 28 J. PUB. POL’Y 1 (2008); Roger J. Goebel, Supranational? Federal? 
Intergovernmental? The Governmental Structure of the European Union After the 
Treaty of Lisbon, 20 COLUMBIA J. EUR. UNION L. 77 (2013); Mathias Reinmann & 
Daniel Halberstam, Top-Down or Bottom-Up? A Look at the Unification of Private 
Law in Federal Systems, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 363–77 
(Roger Brownsword, Hans-W. Micklitz, Leone Niglia, & Stephen Weatherill eds., 
2011); CHARLES F. SABEL & JONATHAN ZEITLIN (eds.), EXPERIMENTALIST 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
4 2000/C 364/01. 
5 The ordoliberal project aims at creating an entrepreneurial society by spreading the 
competition everywhere. The hallmark of the so-called “homo-oeconomicus” is 
therefore no longer a person that only hopes to satisfy his needs, rather it is a person 
who welcomes the competition of interest as an entrepreneur. 
6 See Articles 39, 41, 43 & 44, Treaty on the European Union (TUE). 
7 For an introduction on this type of Europe, see generally LUUK VAN MIDDELAAR, 
THE PASSAGE TO EUROPE: HOW A CONTINENT BECAME A UNION  (Liz Waters trans., 
Yale Univ. Press 2013). 
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A. Resigning From the European Union 
According to Article 50 (1) of the TEU8 any Member State may, in 
accordance with the provisions of its constitution, decide to leave the EU. 
Earlier versions of the treaty do not contain a corresponding provision.9 The 
procedure is regulated in the following sections of Article 50. While the 
respective Member State has to announce its intention to the European 
Council, the norm provides that the EU and the Member State will jointly 
establish a treaty containing the details of the resignation from the EU. In 
light of its prerogatives and powers, the Council must then vote in favor of 
the resignation by a qualified majority after the Parliament has given its 
consent. 
Basically, it is not compulsory to conclude the treaty mentioned in 
Article 50(2) of the TEU. The “exit strategy” depends entirely on the 
respective Member State’s exceptional decision. But one must take into 
account that such a decision would have manifold consequences. In 
particular, considering what will be argued in Section IV on Schmitt’s spatial 
ontology, it would now be prudent to clarify that not only does this decision 
affect the territorial applicability of the EU treaties and EU secondary law, 
but also the composition of EU institutions. Moreover, such a treaty would 
probably contain regulations on the future relationship between the EU and 
the ex-Member State.10 Consequently, if the state at some point wished to re-
join the EU, it would have to go through the ordinary procedure to join as 
would any other candidate, according to Article 49 TEU.11 
This means that the applicant country must comply with what are 
usually known as the “Copenhagen Criteria” – a list of requirements 
established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened 
by the Madrid European Council in 1995.12 In particular, these consist of both 
political and economic criteria as well as the acceptance of the Community 
acquis. There has to be stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. 
Importantly, the applicant country must also have a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union and ability to take on the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Unless further remarks are made, the version referred to is that of Lisbon. 
9 EUROPÄISCHES UNIONSRECHT, at  Article 50, marginal no. 1 (Christoph Vedder & 
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg eds., Springer 2012). 
10 Id. at Article 50, marginal no.6. 
11 Id. Article 50, marginal no. 10. 
12 Id. at Article 49, marginal no. 2. 
13 Id. at Article 49, marginal nos. 4, 6. 
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Avowedly, resigning from the European Union is on the agenda on a 
regular basis in Britain. Provided that the conservative party wins the 
elections in 2015, a referendum on the country’s EU membership might be 
held in 2017. Before putting the plan concerning a referendum into action, 
Prime Minister James Cameron aims at negotiating a better position for the 
UK within the EU. The designated president of the EU Commission, Jean-
Claude Juncker, is basically open to negotiations, however “not at any 
price.”14 A central issue for British eurosceptics is the free movement within 
the EU and their desire to limit migration from the EU to Britain. However, 
this position meets criticism, stating that trying to limit the free movement 
meant renegotiating one of the founding principles of the EU. The outgoing 
president of the EU Commission, José Manuel Barroso, says that the 
principle of free movement was not negotiable; particularly in light of the 
fact that 1.4 million British citizens lived in other Member States, it was only 
fair and just that other EU citizens had the same rights.  Furthermore, Mr. 
Barroso states that an EU exit would remarkably weaken Britain’s position in 
the world, going as far as saying that its “influence would be zero.”15 
 
B. Opting Out of Certain Measures 
Member States may also opt out of implementing certain EU measures, 
particularly within legal cooperation. As a historical fact, the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark are the Member States with most opt-outs. As previously 
mentioned, these decisions usually take the form of a power of reservation on 
specific forms of sociopolitical, legal, and economic collaboration with the 
EU as a whole. By way of an example, the UK’s and Ireland’s reservations 
are made flexible through a so-called opt-in clause. That means that these two 
Member States can decide whether or not they want to implement a legal 
instrument on an act-by-act basis. 
However, for present purposes, and particularly in light of what will be 
contended in Section IV on the exceptional intervention of the Schmittian 
sovereign, it is of pivotal interest that, for its part, Denmark has a general 
reservation on legal cooperation. Indeed, such a power of reservation is, we 
believe, one of the best examples within the EU of Schmitt’s argument that 
the sovereign has the authority to decide on the exception by suspending the 
targeted legal norm. In particular, this is clearly demonstrated by the fact that 
some EU regulations contain a section stating that the term “Member States” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Parliament elects ‘politically ecumenical’ Juncker as Commission President, 
EURACTIV, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/parliament-elects-
politically-ecumenical-juncker-commission-president (July 15, 2014).  
15 EU exit would leave Britain with zero influence, says Barroso, BBC (Oct. 19, 
2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-29680059 (last visited Oct. 26, 2014). 
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in that context refers to all EU Member States except Denmark.16	  To fully 
understand the logic which lies behind this statement, we must bear in 
mind the following: Denmark did fully participate in civil law 
collaboration under the Rome Treaty. However, in the wake of 
Denmark’s ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the country ratified a 
separate agreement – the so-called Edinburgh Decision – in order to 
solve the problems related to the Maastricht Treaty that arose as a 
consequence of the 1992 referendum. Denmark then took four 
reservations concerning cooperation with the EU. Those refer to the 
defense policy, the Euro, Union citizenship and cooperation regarding law 
and police, the last also covering questions regarding foreigners.17 According 
to Article 7 of one of the protocols attached to the Maastricht Treaty, 
Denmark may declare that it no longer wishes to adhere to the reservations; 
however, this declaration must be a general one and cannot relate only to 
certain legal acts. 
In this context, the solution adopted by Ireland and the UK is more 
practicable as they can decide for every act whether or not they want to 
implement it. If Denmark decides to adopt a certain act, there is a possibility 
of concluding a bilateral convention with the EU; however, Denmark is not 
generally entitled to such a treaty. It depends on whether the Commission 
wishes a separate solution for Denmark.18 The reason for Denmark’s 
reservation is that they considered it unacceptable that the formalities of 
collaboration in civil law matters changed from being intergovernmental to 
supranational. The Danish reservation on cooperation in civil law matters 
refers to all acts established under the scope of Article 65 of the Nice Treaty; 
that is, it does not concern existing or forthcoming acts elaborated on an 
intergovernmental level.19 One might get the impression that Denmark 
completely opted out of the common immigration and asylum policy. But in 
fact, the country participated in a number of decisions that ultimately resulted 
in an obligation to implement some of the acts adopted under the scope of 
Part IV of the Maastricht Treaty, albeit in a different legal form than is the 
case in other Member States.20 
The switch from intergovernmental to supranational cooperation 
formalities not only affected collaboration on civil law matters, but also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  BIRGITTE EGELUND OLSEN & KARSTEN ENGSIG SØRENSEN, EUROPÆISERINGEN AF 
DANSK RET 72 (Djøf-forlag 2008). 
17 Id. at 82; EU – The Danish Deference Opt-Out, FORSVARSMINISTERIET MINISTRY 
OF DEFENCE, http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/TheDanishDefenceOpt-
Out.aspx (last updated Mar. 20, 2015). 
18 Id. at 84. OLSEN & SØRENSEN, supra note 16, at 72. 
19 Id. at 83. 
20 Id. at 102. 
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matters related to criminal law and the mobility of persons. But just as was 
the case with civil law matters, Denmark is still involved in acts that are a 
result of intergovernmental cooperation.21 The possibility of opting-out was 
created in 1992 after a Danish referendum initially rejected the Treaty of 
Maastricht. In order to enable Denmark to ratify the Treaty, several 
exceptions were implemented into the protocols of Maastricht.22 The 
protocols start with an exception regarding the purchase of summer houses 
through foreigners in Denmark.23 The country was allowed to maintain its 
existing legislation, which basically makes it impossible for foreigners 
without residence in Denmark to buy summer houses. People who do not 
reside and have not previously resided in Denmark may only acquire real 
estate in Denmark with the consent of the Minister of Justice. Exceptions can 
be made if the property is meant to serve as a full time home.24 Basically, this 
law violates the prohibition of discrimination against other EU citizens 
outlined in Article 18 TFEU (ex-Article 12 TEC).25 
Denmark’s tendency towards reservations concerning EU law revealed 
itself again in 2013 when the Danish Supreme Court had to deal with the 
question of whether the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was in accordance 
with the Danish constitution. The court’s decision has also been interpreted in 
a way that could see the Danish Supreme Court take a stricter approach to the 
ultra vires review of both EU legislation and judgments handed down by the 
ECJ. However, this should not automatically result in the court declaring 
those acts invalid in Denmark.26 Furthermore, Denmark opted out of the third 
stage of the Economic and Monetary Union.27 The third stage, beginning 
January 1, 1999, covered the transition from national currencies to the Euro.28  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Id. at 91. 
22http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1428937943045&uri=URISERV:l25061 (last visited Apr. 13, 
2015) 
23 The Maastricht Treaty, EUROTREATIES.COM, at 2 (Feb. 7, 1992) 
http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtprotocols.pdf (last visited July 18, 2014). 
24 § 1 Lov om erhvervelse af fast ejendom [Danish Act on the Acquisition of Real 
Estate].  
25 Article 18 TFEU prohibits discrimination based on the citizenship. 
Diskriminierungsverbot, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/brussels/website/media/Lexikon/Pdf/Diskriminierung
sverbot.pdf (last visited June 30, 2014). 
26 Henrik Palmer Olsen, The Danish Supreme Court’s decision on the 
constitutionality of Denmark’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, 50 COMMON MKT. 
L. REV. 1489, 1503 (2013). 
27 Official Journal C 348, 31/12/1992, Denmark and the Treaty on the European 
Union. 
28 PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW 700 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011). 
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Furthermore, Poland and the UK have specific reservations regarding the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.29 The two countries requested Protocol 30, 
which will also be applicable to the Czech Republic.30 For present purposes, 
there are two main relevant points in the protocol. According to Article 1(1) 
of the protocol, the Charter provides neither the ECJ nor the national courts 
of Poland or the UK with the extended competence to find national laws, 
regulations or administrative rules, practices, or actions contradictory to the 
fundamental rights, freedoms and principles reaffirmed in the charter. The 
Charter does not have the power to create justiciable rights that did not 
previously exist. Furthermore, according to Article 2 of the Charter, 
references made to national laws concern the laws of Poland and the UK only 
to the extent to which the respective rights and practices are recognized by 
Polish and UK law.31 
Importantly, other opt-outs currently in force refer to the Schengen 
Agreement; EU citizenship; and the areas of freedom, security and justice. 
 
III. UNCONVENTIONAL OPT-OUTS 
In addition to the conventional opt-outs that are part of EU law, one can 
also find unconventional opt-outs regarding membership in the EU. Yet, 
despite the superficial characteristics which differentiate these unofficial 
schemes from their official counterparts, in Section IV we will argue that 
indirect forms of opt-out are informed by the exceptional attempt of the 
Schmittian sovereign to (try to) take back its legal, socio-, and geopolitical 
power over issues of public concern and/or strategic interest. The essence of 
this claim requires us to first describe and contextualize these alternative 
forms of non-cooperation. 
Lately, separatist movements have blossomed in parts of several 
Member States. Current examples of this independentist wave are Scotland, 
Catalonia and Venetia. Both Scotland and Catalonia have for many years had 
autonomous status within the United Kingdom and Spain respectively.32 
These tendencies may ultimately result in unconventional opt-outs, although 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The Charter is not a part of the EU treaties, however according to Article 6 TEU it 
has the same legal status as the treaties, see CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 28, at 
394. 
30 Steve Peers, The Opt-Out that Fell to Earth: The British and Polish Protocol 
Concerning the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 375 
(2012). 
31 Id. at 377. 
32 SCOTT L. GREER, THE POLITICS OF AUTONOMY IN SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA 2 
(State Univ. of New York Press 2007). Greer calls those regions and other 
comparable ones such as Basque Country, Galicia and Corsica, stateless nations. 
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if the regions at some point become independent states, it does not mean that 
they will automatically become Member States. 
What is of pivotal relevance for present purposes is that EU law does not 
contain any rules on how to handle a secessionist part of a Member State.33 
What is now labeled “the battle for independence” raises several important 
questions, ranging from the essence of the so-called “national identity” issue 
in the age of globalization and harmonization, to the impact of the 
independence of an ex-country-of-membership’s economy and thus the EU’s 
economy as a whole. More importantly, while commenting in Madrid in 
December 2013 on the Catalonian decision to fix a date for a secessionist 
referendum, the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, 
clarified that any secessionist region would be considered and treated as a 
“new independent state.”34 This basically means that the “new sovereign” 
will have to submit an application to join the Union according to the 
aforementioned Article 49 TEU. 
 
A. The Scottish Referendum 
In October 2012, the governments of the UK and Scotland concluded an 
agreement, the so-called Edinburgh Agreement, concerning the Scottish 
independence referendum set to take place on September 18, 2014. 
Arguments in favor of Scotland’s independence spoke of greater democracy, 
increased prosperity and a more equitable society. Avowedly, the fifty-three 
percent of the voters decided that Scotland should not leave the UK. Yet this 
also meant that the forty-seven percent of the voters opted for the 
independentist solution. A result that expresses a massive socio-, bio- and 
geopolitical force that needs to be properly addressed. 
Before the referendum took place, the Scottish government made it clear 
that if the results would be in favor of Scotland’s independence, it would do 
whatever it takes to discuss with the English government, the other Member 
States, and EU institutions, an appropriate procedure by which Scotland may 
transit to an independent EU membership.35 This claim should be viewed in 
light of Scotland’s well-known desire to remain a member of the EU 
independently of internal political issues. Yet this situation has neither arisen 
before in the history of the EU, nor was it foreseen when the European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future, Your Guide to an Independent Scotland 
221 (Nov. 2013), 
https://www.scotreferendum.com/reports/scotlands-future-your-guide-to-an-
independent-scotland/ (last visited June 30, 2014). 
34 Scottish independence: Scots EU independence plan ‘now untenable’,  BBC 
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treaties were drafted. However, since the referendum resulted in favor of 
Scotland remaining part of the UK, these socio-political and legal sentiments 
have been displaced from view. Still, there are proposals for further 
devolution of powers to Scotland.36 Needless to say, the realization of this 
subsidiary design will depend on the political roadmap that the new UK 
government, to be elected in May 2015, will put forward.37 
Over the last few months, several socio- and geopolitical, economic, and 
legal commentators have offered their personal – and sometimes 
opportunistic – opinions on the Scottish desire for independence by inquiring 
into both Scotland’s future and that of the EU if the UK loses such an 
important partner. However, we argue that they all failed to understand the 
unofficial – and, thus, “occult” – force that lies behind the independentist 
instance as we describe in section IV. In this regard, it is worth mentioning 
that, given Van Rompuy’s declaration, a great deal of EU scholarship has 
unsuccessfully tried to examine the “true” meaning of a well-known 
statement made by the former President of the European Commission, José 
Manuel Barroso, on a visit to London in mid-February 2014. Mr. Barroso 
surprised everyone by saying that it would be “extremely difficult, if not 
impossible,”38 for Scotland to secure permission to join the EU as an 
independent, sovereign country. According to many, the fact that Mr. Barroso 
was right is clearly demonstrated by the circumstance that those EU Member 
States that still refuse to recognize the independence of Kosovo would clearly 
have no difficulty in not welcoming an independent Scotland into the EU. 
The foregoing must also be viewed in light of the recent declarations 
made by UK Prime Minister David Cameron. The UK has long wanted the 
EU’s bureaucratic voting system to switch from majority voting to 
unanimous decision-making. The UK’s financial-services veto collided with 
France’s refusal on this change. And it is precisely this refusal that led 
Cameron to assure Britons, in a speech that he gave in January 2013, that he 
would be negotiating a new settlement with the EU and that “. . . by 2017, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Secretary of State for Scotland, The parties’ published proposals on further 
devolution for Scotland, HM GOVERNMENT (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/36323
6/Command_paper.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
37 Scotland’s Referendum, Isn’t the Scottish Parliament going to get more powers 
anyway if Scotland votes No?, SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, 
https://www.scotreferendum.com/questions/isnt-the-scottish-parliament-going-to-get-
more-powers-anyway-if-scotland-votes-no/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (website 
archived Oct. 20, 2014). 
38 Rajeev Syal, Independent Scotland ‘would find it extremely difficult to join EU,’ 
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/feb/16/independent-scotland-extremely-
difficult-join-eu (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
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British people would be given a choice in a referendum to stay in the Europe 
Union or to leave” should he win the elections in 2015.39 
Although Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, has recently 
supported this call for change, it has once again encountered the veto of 
France’s President, François Hollande. At the press conference at the end of 
the bilateral meeting held in January 2014, Hollande said that the UK’s 
demands for EU treaty changes by 2017 – a prelude to the aforementioned in-
out referendum over EU membership – were “not a priority for the time 
being.” In fact, although France is no longer as influential as it was a couple 
of years ago and Germany – as Angela Merkel confirmed during her recent 
visit to London – wants treaty change as much as the UK, any architectural 
revision is becoming less likely for several reasons, one of which is rising 
Euroscepticism. 
That said, it was evident from the very beginning that the relevance of 
the socio-, bio- and geopolitical force that pushed for the Scottish referendum 
ought not be taken for granted. In particular, Mr. Barroso’s statement 
revealed the fear that if Scotland would have voted itself out of the UK, 
British Eurosceptics would have been more likely to do the same vis-à-vis the 
EU in 2017 should Mr. Cameron win the national elections in 2015. The 
recent declarations made by Mr. Cameron on why the new EC President, 
Jean-Claude Juncker, is the wrong person to lead the EU, have to be analyzed 
within this perspective. This is also the reason why the German Chancellor, 
Angela Merkel, who has been vehemently calling for structural treaty 
changes, has welcomed the news that Scotland would remain in the UK, and 
thus the EU. 
 
B. Catalonia 
In Catalonia, the situation regarding the independentist referendum is 
much more complicated. On September 19, 2014, the parliament of the 
autonomous community of Catalonia voted by a margin of 106 to 28 in favor 
of authorizing the referendum over the independence from Spain. Right after 
the vote, the President of Catalonia, Artur Mas, signed the decree allowing 
the local consultation on November 9, 2014. Not surprisingly, several socio-
political scholars and commentators doubted the legitimacy of both the 
parliament’s approval and presidential decree. More importantly, on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The UK’s Labour Party leader, Ed Miliband, is of a different opinion. See THE 
ECONOMIST’s editorial Labour and Europe: Europhile and proud (Mar. 15, 2014). 
For a summary of all declarations on the Scottish referendum quoted in this section 
see the special analyses in TIME, Sept. 8, 2014, and THE ECONOMIST, July 12, 2014 
and Sept. 13, 2014. For an overview on how the nationalist sentiment has arisen after 
the referendum, see THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 13 2014. 
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September 29, 2014, Spain’s Constitutional Court deemed the referendum 
unconstitutional. Mr. Mas has nevertheless declared that the vote would take 
place as an act of sovereign freedom. He then set up a committee of seven 
political scientists and lawyers elected by the local parliament to administer 
the independence referendum. More than eight hundred mayors, representing 
ninety-six percent of Catalonia’s municipalities, who have publicly asked for 
the taking place of the secessionist initiative, supported the decision. 
According to the most recent and accurate poll as described by the sources 
mentioned above, fifty-percent of the eighty-percent of Catalans who want 
the referendum would vote yes. However, what matters here is that as a 
consequence of the Constitutional Court’s decision, the November 9th vote 
was a non-binding consultation conducted by volunteers and held only in 
Catalonian regional government buildings.40 The Spanish government 
announced that it is also considering legal action against the alternative 
consultation to be undertaken in Catalonia if its government violates the 
national law again. It is usually maintained that the government ensured 
compliance with the law and guaranteed the citizens’ rights.41 
That said, it is worth mentioning that, in pure economic terms, Catalonia 
represents one-fifth of Spain’s economy.42 Being one of the more prosperous 
regions of Spain, its secession would certainly be detrimental to the rest of 
the country. Yet there are also skeptical voices saying that Catalonia would 
suffer economically after secession. According to a study released by the 
anti-sovereign movement, Societat Civil Catalana, Catalonian independence 
might result in an unemployment quota as high as thirty-four percent and the 
loss of roughly 447,000 workplaces.43 Economists argue that an independent 
Catalonia not being a member of the EU is economically not manageable.44 
In the broader context, it is worth mentioning that the rejection of the 
independentist wave is influenced by the sentiment against the so-called 
Franco era. Indeed, current separatist tendencies in Catalonia and other 
Autonomous Communities in Spain have their roots in the post-war pre-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Al Goodman, No Catalonia independence referendum for now, president says, 
CNN (Oct. 14, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/14/world/europe/spain-
catalonia-referendum/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
41 Francesco Manetto, El Gobierno encarga informes para ver si recurred al 
Constitucional el 9-N, EL PAÍS (Oct. 24, 2014), 
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/10/24/actualidad/1414156796_655037.html 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
42 Goodman, supra note 40. 
43 EL PERIÓDICO POLITICA, Societat Civil pronostica el “colapso” de una Catalunya 
independiente (Oct. 24, 2014), 
http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/politica/societat-civil-pronostica-colapso-
una-catalunya-independiente-3628941 (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
44 Sergio Fidalgo, “Una Cataluña independiente no es económicamente viable,” 
CRONICA GLOBAL (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/notices/2014/10/gay-de-liebana-una-cataluna-
independiente-no-es-economicamente-viable-12293.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
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monarchic historical period, during which much of the cultural and linguistic 
diversity that is typical of Spain was suppressed. Regional languages such as 
Catalán, Basque or Galician were prohibited, and the symbolic elements of 
the regions, such as flags and nationalist anthems, were banned.45 After 
Franco’s death, a new Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia came into force in 
1979. Yet Artículo 2 of the Spanish Constitution46 states “the indissoluble 
unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all 
Spaniards.”47 Through the adoption of the “united in our differences” 
strategy, Section 2 further maintains that this unity is achieved by 
recognizing and guaranteeing “the right to self-government of the 
nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among 
them all.”48 The fact that the Constitution itself was enacted after a 
legitimizing national referendum weakens all secessionist instances. 
However, the ongoing tension between these two principles has hampered 
full recognition of Spain as a pluri-national democracy, or a nation without a 
state, like Scotland, rather than a “multi-national” state. In light of what will 
be argued in Section IV, it would now be prudent to specify that Montserrat 
Guibernau defines nations without states as entities that do not identify with 
them, despite having their territories within the boundaries of one or more 
states.49 Even the new King Felipe VI sees the danger here; upon his 
ascension to the throne, he pointed out in a speech that diversity in language 
and culture is an important part of Spain as a whole.50 
Considering all relevant news, and in particular that those in favor of 
Catalonia’s independence argue that the public consultation process is 
necessary to reset the sovereign relationship between Catalonia and Spain,51 
it is not surprising that Catalonians were able to vote and express their 
opinion on November 9, 2014; yet this was merely a public consultation with 
a considerable socio-political impact over issues of national and EU law. This 
is why the forthcoming regional and national elections will reveal more about 
the extent and impact of the secessionist sentiment. Their outcome will have 
to be evaluated while bearing in mind that the Spanish Parliament rejected a 
petition on the transfer of power to hold a referendum as outlined in Artículo 
150(2) of the Spanish Constitution, according to which the state basically can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Montserrat Guibernau, Prospects for an independent Catalonia, 27 INT’L J. POL. 1, 
10 (2014). 
46 BOE No 311, Dec. 29, 1978. 
47 Id. at Article II. 
48 Id.  
49 Guibernau, supra note 45, at 5. 
50 LA VANGUARDIA, Felipe VI: “En España, unida y diversa, cabemos todos” (June 
19, 2014), 
http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/felipe-vi/20140619/54410102982/felipe-vi-en-
espana-unida-diversa-cabemos-todos.html (last visited June 30, 2014). 
51 CATALONIA VOTES, Why a vote?, 
http://www.cataloniavotes.eu/why-a-referendum/ (last visited June 26, 2014). 
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transfer or delegate certain powers to the Autonomous Regions. Should an 
official referendum take place, according to what was publicly stated by the 
referendum promoters, the consultation as such would consist of two 
questions. First, “Do you want Catalonia to be a state?” Second, “If so, do 
you want Catalonia to be an independent state?” If the majority of voters 
answer both questions negatively, there will be no change to Catalonia’s 
political and legal status. If the majority answers both questions 
affirmatively, the secession process will have to start and all necessary steps 
will be taken accordingly. However, it is also possible that the first question 
may be answered affirmatively while the second one may be answered 
negatively. This would mean that the majority of Catalonians wish their 
region to be a state, but not an independent one – rather, a state within the 
larger kingdom of Spain.52 
Recently, the conflict has been taken to another level as the Supreme 
Court of Catalonia accepted the criminal prosecution of members of the 
Catalan government for authorizing and co-organizing the consultation on 
November 9th. Critics say that the authorization and co-organization was not 
illegal because the Constitutional Court had only temporarily suspended the 
vote but not declared it illegal.53 In addition to that, no dialogue has taken 
place between the Catalan president Artur Mas and the President of the 
Government Mariano Rajoy in six months.54 
Early regional elections have been scheduled for September 27, 2015, 
seven months later than people expected. According to Mr. Rajoy, who hopes 
that economic recovery will push national pride and stop the secessionist 
plan, the call for these elections, the third within five years, clearly indicates 
the failure of Mas and the Catalan government.55 Other regions and 
municipalities will hold elections in May. The landscape is thus very 
confusing. This is why the parties in favor of Catalonia’s independence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 CATALONIA VOTES, The 9N Vote, 
http://www.cataloniavotes.eu/referendum/#what (last visited June 26, 2014). 
53 CATALONIA VOTES, Supreme Court accepts prosecution of Catalan President for 
symbolic vote on independence (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://www.cataloniavotes.eu/tsjc-formally-charges-mas-ortega-and-rigau-for-9n/ 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
54 Mas y Rajoy no hablan desde hace seis meses, EL PAIS (Apr. 5, 2015), 
http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2015/01/16/catalunya/1421400585_349779.html 
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1428937943045&uri=URISERV:l25061 (last visited January 
30, 2015). 
55 Rajoy dice que el Adelanto de las elecciones evidencia el fracas de Mas, EL PAÍS 
(Apr. 15, 2015), 
 http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/01/15/actualidad/1421332146_825187.html 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
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expect the regional ones to be a clear indicator on how the process regarding 
self-determination will develop.56 
Just like in Scotland, or related to a possible EU exit of the UK, there are 
questions in regards to the economic and political consequences of 
Catalonia’s independence. 
 
C. Venetia, Lombardy and Sardinia 
A third example of the extent of current secession tendencies in Europe 
is the northern Italian region of Venetia. In a privately organized, non-
binding referendum held in March 2014, eighty-nine percent of votes were in 
favor of Venetia’s independence. The percentage of participation in the poll 
was 62.3 percent of all those eligible to vote.57 Critics have noted that a 
substantial portion of votes came from outside Italy; for instance ten percent 
came from Chile. Despite the criticism of the informal poll, organizers have 
requested an official binding referendum on the secession of Venetia. The 
regional council of Venetia recently approved a bill concerning such a 
referendum.58 As a next step, a corresponding law has to be approved by the 
national government.59 
Two other examples are the Italian provinces of Lombardy and Sardinia. 
Several organizations have arisen over the last few years in both territories to 
promote the independence of each from Italy, i.e, Pro Lombardia 
Indipendenza and Partito Indipendentista Sardo. As of this writing, 
consultations are underway to organize possible referendums along the 
exceptional exit-strategy path undertaken by Venetia. It is worth mentioning 
that in Sardinia, a province of 1.6 million people, more than 27,000 
signatures were collected in April 2014, far surpassing the 10,000 required to 
schedule a referendum. The date for the referendum will be set shortly. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 CATALONIA VOTES, Catalans to have ‘de facto’ referendum on independence via 
early election on 27 September (Jan. 15, 2015), 
 http://www.cataloniavotes.eu/catalans-to-have-de-facto-referendum-on-
independence-via-early-elections-on-27-september/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
57 Referendum Di Indipendenza Del Veneto: I Risultati, PLEBISCITO.EU, 
http://blog.plebiscito.eu/news/referendum-di-indipendenza-del-veneto-i-risultati/ (last 
visited June 28, 2014). 
58 Indipendenza del Veneto, via libera del consiglio regionale al referendum, 
CORRIERE DEL VENETO, 
http://corrieredelveneto.corriere.it/veneto/notizie/politica/2014/12-giugno-
2014/indipendenza-veneto-via-libera-consiglio-regionale-referendum--
223385301837.shtml (last updated June 13, 2014). 
59 Test-Referendum: Venezier stimmen für Loslösung von Italien, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
(March 22, 2014), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/separatisten-in-venetiens-
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IV. UNDERSTANDING THE SCHMITTIAN ‘EXCEPTION’  
IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
All direct forms of opt-out and indirect schemes of unconventional 
secessionism from the European project discussed thus far cannot be 
understood fully by only looking at their positivistic and official 
presentations. In particular, we contend, such an approach would be unable to 
address their “occult” – and yet powerful – essence. Comparative law teaches 
us that, as lawyers, our efforts should always be directed at discovering the 
unofficial, or figuratively “impossible,” by combining traditional notions 
with unexplored conceits of law and legal reasoning through a multi-
disciplinary approach.60 Only in this way is it possible to understand the 
sociopolitical, legal, and ontological exceptional essence of the mechanisms 
with which this paper deals. Given the scope of our inquiry and the 
unavoidable relationship among law, society, and culture,61 political 
theology, biopolitics and political anthropology are of significant help. A few 
words on their notions are therefore necessary. 
Bearing in mind Schmitt’s claim that “all significant concepts of the 
modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts,”62 political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60  For an introduction, see EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW (Mark Van Hoecke ed., Hart Publishing 2004); MAURICE ADAMS AND JACCO 
BOMHOFF, PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW (Cambridge University 
Press 2010); METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (PIER GIUSEPPE MONATERI ed., 
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University Press 2014). 
61 Yet we believe that this delicate relationship is instrumentally manipulated most of 
the time. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANT: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW (University of Georgia Press 1993) (1974); id. The Importance of “Nutshells” 
42 AM. J. OF COMP. LAW 1 (1994); Contra, see Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of 
“Legal Transplant” 4 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUROPEAN AND COMP. LAW  111 (1997). 
62 CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 36 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of 
Chicago Press 2005) (1922, 1934).  
Finally, for an understanding of Schmitt’s thoughts increasing relevance within legal 
and political theory, see  
MARIANO CROCE & ANDREA SALVATORE, THE LEGAL THEORY OF CARL SCHMITT 
(Routledge 2012); WILLIAM HOOKER, CARL SCHMITT’S INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT: 
ORDER AND ORIENTATION (Cambridge University Press 2009); THE CHALLENGE OF 
CARL SCHMITT (Chantal Mouffe ed., Verso 1999): ELLEN KENNEDY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE: CARL SCHMITT IN WEIMAR (Duke Univ. Press 2004); 
JEFFREY SEITZER, COMPARATIVE HISTORY AND LEGAL THEORY: CARL SCHMITT IN 
THE FIRST GERMAN DEMOCRACY (GREENWOOD PRESS 2001); WILLIAM RASCH, 
NIKLAS LUHMANN’S MODERNITY: THE PARADOXES OF DIFFERENTIATION (Stanford 
Univ. Press 2000); id.; Human Rights as Geopolitics: Carl Schmitt and the Legal 
Form of American Supremacy, (2003), 54 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 120 (2003); LAW AS 
POLITICS: CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM (David Dyzenhaus ed.; Duke 
Univ. Press 1998);  JOHN P. MCCORMICK, CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF 
LIBERALISM: AGAINST POLITICS AS TECHNOLOGY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997); 
DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY. CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN, 
AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (Clarendon Press 1991); PAUL EDWARD 
GOTTFRIED, CARL SCHMITT: POLITICS AND THEORY (Greenwood Press 1990); 
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theology may be defined as a social science that, in Paul W. Kahn’s words, 
“understands politics as an organization of everyday life founded on an 
imagination of the sacred.”63 That is to say, “political theology traces the 
genealogy of political concepts and explores analogies between the political 
and the religious in the social imaginary.”64  
On the other hand, the emergence of biopolitics and its current relevance 
within legal discourse has to be related to the birth and spread of the modern 
geopolitical and anthropological65 theme of “population” and to the 
difficulties of providing a useful and feasible definition of it. Credit for 
having brought attention to the implications of the term “biopolitics” is 
usually attributed to Michel Foucault. In particular, as Agamben writes whilst 
inquiring the intersection between the juridico-institutional and biopolitical 
schemes of power, “at the end of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, 
[Foucault] summarizes the process by which, at the threshold of the modern 
era, natural life begins to be included in the mechanism and calculations of 
State power, and politics turns into biopolitics.”66 However, it is noteworthy 
that it was Hannah Arendt who inquired, in The Human Condition, published 
in 1958, the entry of zoē into the dimension of the polis as the process that led 
to the centrality for modern politics of the so-called homo laborans. And it is 
the combination of Foucault’s and Arendt’s suggestions that shows not only 
why and how, as Agamben claims, the “production of a biopolitical body is 
the original activity of sovereign power,”67 but also why and how this activity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
GEORGE SCHWAB, THE CHALLENGE OF THE EXCEPTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
POLITICAL IDEAS OF CARL SCHMITT BETWEEN 1921 AND 1936 (Greenwood Press 
1989); JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY, CARL SCHMITT: THEORIST FOR THE REICH (Princeton 
Univ. Press 1983). 
63 PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 23 (Columbia Univ. Press 2011); see also the definition of political 
theology offered by Jürgen Moltmann in his THE CRUCIFIED GOD 62 (SCM Press Ltd. 
1974). 
64 Kahn, supra note 63, at 124. It was Karl Marx who first coined the term “political 
theology.” Yet, as Harold J. Berman has persuasively argued in his masterpiece Law 
and Revolution, political theology is rooted in Gregory VII’s Papal Revolution. In 
particular, Berman demonstrated that the word theology “was applied for the first 
time by Abelard to the systematic study of the evidence of the nature of the divinity.” 
See LAW AND REVOLUTION. THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION, I, 
175 (Harvard Univ. Press 1983). 
65 For an introduction to the significance of an anthropological approach to law and 
legal reasoning, see LEGALISM: ANTHROPOLOGY AND HISTORY (PAUL DRESCH & 
HANNAH SKODA eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2012). 
66 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 3 (Werner 
Hamacher & David E. Wellbery eds., Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. 
Press 1998) (1995). 
67 Id. at 6. Not surprisingly, Agamben is of the idea that “the concept of ‘life’ . . . 
must constitute the subject of the coming philosophy” and that this “genealogical 
inquiry . . . will demonstrate that ‘life’ is not a medical and scientific notion, but a 
philosophical, political, and theological concept.” See Giorgio Agamben, Absolute 
Immanence, in POTENTIALITIES 238-39 (Daniel Heller-Roazen ed. & trans., Stanford 
Univ. Press 1999). 
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would be meaningless should it not also be aimed at further protecting that 
biopolitical body. Biopower understands the “occult” essence of the (modern) 
entity that we call “population” as the ultimate goal of the science of political 
and decisive government. This is the reason why the essence of Schmitt’s 
decisionism cannot be understood completely without a parallel investigation 
into the notion of biopolitical power. 
For present purposes, it is worth mentioning that Schmitt’s critique of 
Machiavelli’s decision not to enter the biopolitical dimension of modern 
power, and hence his inability to understand the link between, on the one 
hand, sovereignty and the life and death of the single individual, and on the 
other one, disorder and protection of order,68 demonstrates that biopower 
works according to the double implication that renders every “political” 
concept a “spatial” concept and vice versa.69 In other words, the fact that 
politics makes sense only when represented within a tangible space of 
sociopolitical representation means nothing more than that the ontological 
notion of “space” needs politics to make sense from a sociological 
perspective. Through the emergence of disciplines and concepts such as 
biopolitics and biopower, the concept of “population” has indeed witnessed 
an ontological and sociopolitical shift: from being the “object” of the sterile 
act of government, it has become a specific, living “subject” in perpetual 
need of particular biopolitical attentions that ought not to be taken for 
granted. 
Delving into this discourse, the following pages are aimed at 
demonstrating that both direct and indirect forms of opt-out from the EU 
reveal the exceptional attempt of the Schmittian sovereign to (try to) take 
back its legal, socio-, and geopolitical power over issues of public concern 
and/or strategic interest. This is done by drawing the boundaries and purview 
of the ‘friend/enemy’ antithesis. Hence, it is our suggestion that what is at 
stake when direct opt-outs and indirect schemes of non-participation in the 
European process take place is, on the one hand, the intimate essence of 
Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty, and on the other one, the socio-, bio- and 
geopolitical representation70 of the unconventional essence of the concept of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 GIORGIO GALLI, LO SGUARDO DI GIANO. SAGGI SU CARL SCHMITT  83 (ilMulino 
2008). 
69 In Writings on War, Schmitt claimed that “there are neither spaceless political 
ideas nor, reciprocally, spaces without ideas or principles of spaces without ideas.” 
CARL SCHMITT, WRITINGS ON WAR 87 (Timothy Nunan trans. & ed.. Polity Press 
2011) (1937-1945). 
70 Political representation is a key-concept in Schmitt’s thought. This clearly emerges 
from his Constitutional Theory and Legality and Legitimacy, which, although 
differently, are both aimed at demonstrating that representation, in terms of 
“acclamation of the people,” is the canon of democratic politics. In particular, in 
Schmitt’s words, “The dialect of [representation] is that the invisible is presupposed 
as absent and nevertheless is simultaneously made present.” The act of representation 
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“force-people” which was first investigated, as Andrea Cavalletti notes,71 by 
Giovanni Botero. 
Yet before going any further, we should specify that this claim cannot be 
understood fully without a reference to the postmodern and neorealist phases 
of what Siliquini-Cinelli labeled the “Europeanization of Europe”72 as the 
process aimed at creating a supranational entity in which classic forms of law 
and politics – and thus the Member States themselves – will play an 
increasingly weak role. In particular, the “Europeanization of Europe” and its 
statelessness fantasy are the mythical, and yet powerful, representation of 
something that has never existed in geopolitical and ontological terms 
(Europe) and may be further seen as the continental paradigms of the process 
aimed at achieving the formal “depoliticization” and “dejuridification” of the 
world. The final goal of this process is to transform the “Europe of trading” 
into the uniformed and formally apolitical “Europe of rights,” while passing 
through a single market and a monetary economic union (the EU) with 
common fiscal policies supported by a banking union. From a pure politico-
theological perspective, the “Europeanization of Europe” represents, then, a 
threat to classic forms of political and legal power because it displaces the 
necessity of the “miracle” by promoting a sterile world of uniformity and 
regularity in which there is neither need for a nomos in terms of “division,” 
“allocation,” and “appropriation” (Nahme) of rights, interests, obligations and 
duties,73 nor space for the exceptional decisive will of the Schmittian 
sovereign. Consequently, in the European Oikoumene there is no need for the 
Schmittian concept of the “political” as manifested by the earthly and 
democratic “friend/enemy” dichotomy either.74 While the impact of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(or signification), then, may be defined as the device that signifies and makes visible 
and extant what is invisible and absent. See CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY 243 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans. and ed.; Duke Univ. Press 2008). 
71 LA CITTÀ BIOPOLITICA. MITOLOGIE DELLA SICUREZZA 33 (Mondadori 2005). 
72 See EUROPE AND ITS (TRAGIC) STATELESSNESS FANTASY: THE LURE OF EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW, POST-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ORDER (Vandeplas 
Publishing 2014). On the “Constitution of Europe,” see JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?”  
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); id.; A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices, 
40(4) J. OF COMMON MKT. STUDIES 563 (2002); See also EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE (J. H. H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2003); Joseph HH Weiler, Gràinne de Bùrca (eds.), THE 
WORLDS OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM THE STATE (Gràinne de Bùrca & J. H. 
H. Weiler eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). 
73 See infra note 82. 
74 According to Schmitt, the canon of the concept of the “political” is the distinction 
between “friend” and “enemy.” It is indeed only this distinction that is capable of 
denoting, in Schmitt’s words, “the utmost degree of a union or separation, of an 
association of dissociation.” This powerful capacity is ultimately rooted in the fact 
that the “friend/enemy” (or “us/them”) distinction “can exist theoretically and 
practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon all those moral, aesthetic, 
economic, or other distinctions.” 
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federalist projects that have occurred over the last few years within the EU 
are another testament to this,75 the independentist instances at the center of 
this contribution may be considered as the rejection of the totalizing trend in 
the continent. 
 
A. Schmitt’s State of Exception (Necessitas Non Habet Legem) 
Schmitt is a complicated thinker and writer. Both his personal and 
professional lives are a reflection of Germany’s, and thus Europe’s, traumatic 
experience over the last century. He developed his theory of the state of 
exception and concept of the “political” several years before publishing The 
Nomos of the Earth – which began between 1942 and 1945 and thus after the 
failure of Operation Barbarossa and the entry of the US into the war. 
However, credit for turning the attention of a great deal of legal scholarship 
to Schmitt’s geographies of the nomos and exceptional ways to protect the 
political domain of the sovereign over them is generally given to Agamben’s 
recasting of Schmitt’s original notion of the sovereign as he “who decides on 
the exception.” Yet to understand Schmitt’s complicated thought fully would 
require extended treatment, certainly more than can be provided here. Our 
intention is therefore merely to highlight what is relevant for our purpose. It 
is indeed only through the combination of Schmitt’s pre-war politico-
theological inquiry and post-war spatial thinking that we can try to 
understand why classic, conventional forms of opt-out from the EU and their 
indirect counterparts are both aimed at re-affirming the authority of the 
political sovereign by claiming the significance of “democracy” as, on the 
one hand, biopolitical and anthropological “identity” between “governor” and 
“governed,” and, on the other, distinction from the “other.”  
In Political Theology, Schmitt challenges Austin and Kelsen’s legal 
positivism and the doctrine underpinning liberalism. In particular, Schmitt 
argues against the liberal (norm-based) theory of law and justice, and thus 
liberal neutrality and its political sin – that is, according to Kahn, “the belief 
that it can always be inclusive because talk will lead to understanding, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26 (George Schwab trans. and ed., Univ. of 
Chicago Press 2007) (1927, 1932). See also Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, “The Age of 
“Depoliticization” and “Dejuridification” and its “Logic of Assembling”: An Essay 
Against the Instrumentalist Use of Comparative Laws Geopolitics 37 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
75 In federal systems there is no exceptional power-center, but rather a plurality of 
institutions sharing power. See Yishai Blank Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role 
of Local Governments in an Age of Global Multilevel Governance 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L. J. 509 (2010); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Debate about Sovereignty in the United 
States: A Historical and Comparative Perspective, SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 
423-48 (Neil Walker ed., Hart Publishing 2003). 
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understanding to agreement.”76 He also promoted a notion of sovereign 
power that is revealed by and in the decision on “the state of exception.” In 
particular, while joining the debate on the so-called Methodenstreit – the 
“conflict of methods” that kept European analytical jurisprudence busy 
throughout the nineteenth century – Schmitt claimed that the true sovereign is 
only revealed when “the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception 
and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a 
rule.”77 The juxtaposition of the law is evident: on the one hand, there is the 
dominant form of legal theory in the prewar era (that is, “statutory legal 
positivism,” promoted by Gerber, Laband and Anschütz) and thus the utopian 
neo-Kantian conception of a pure theory of law; and, on the other, there is 
liberalism (and its promotion of endless negotiations) and romanticism (and 
its belief in aesthetic occasionalism).  
The exception (Ausnahmefall) to which Schmitt refers is the case of 
extreme peril that threatens the survival of the legal order and yet cannot be 
overcome by the sterile, positivistic application of the norm, because, strictly 
speaking, it is not regulated by it. Such an exceptional situation can thus only 
be approached and managed through unlimited political authority. The 
decision regarding the exception is, in this sense, the revolutionary and 
decisive act by which the true, democratically legitimated sovereign suspends 
the targeted norm to save the legal order unconventionally from its own death 
(necessitas non habet legem). 
From a practical perspective, such a revolutionary suspension is 
characterized by the inclusion in the (momentarily inactive) order of 
something that officially lies outside its normative confinements.78 The 
paradox of the Schmittian notion of sovereignty is therefore clear: non-
juridical “disorder” is included within the juridical order through the doors of 
the exception, which are opened with the political suspension of the norm.79 
Importantly, the true sovereign guarantees the persistence of this exceptional 
situation as long as it is necessary for the survival of the legal order. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Kahn, supra note 63, at 135. The same strategy is followed by (political) 
romanticism, whose aesthetic, subjected occasionalism, and metaphysics of absolute 
individualism (mainly based on Fichte’s absolute ego and philosophy of science and 
Schelling’s philosophy of nature and notion of external reality) was merely aimed at 
opening the “self” to a world of possible realities. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 52–
108. 
77 Agamben, supra note 66, at 18. 
78 Agamben claims that the exception is “an inclusive exclusion, an ex-ceptio in the 
literal sense of the term.” See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE TIME THAT REMAINS: A 
COMMENTARY TO THE LETTER TO THE ROMANS 104–08 (Patricia Dailey trans., 
Stanford Univ. Press 2005). 
79 In Schmitt’s words, “Pure decisionism presupposes a disorder that can only be 
brought into order by actually making a decision.” See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 62. 
See also Kennedy, supra note 62, 54–91. 
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Thus, the exception cannot be subsumed. This is further demonstrated by 
the fact that, as discussed while analyzing the Scottish referendum, the 
founding fathers of the EU did not foresee the indirect possibility of any 
secessionist instances. As Agamben’s topological approach to Schmitt has 
revealed,“the state of exception separates the norm from its application in 
order [to introduce] a zone of anomie into the law [and then] make the 
effective regulation of the real possible.” 80 In particular, the fact that the 
exceptional power (only) suspends – and not fully eliminates – the norm with 
the aim of saving it explains why, according to Schmitt, the sovereign is at 
the same time “outside and inside the juridical order.” This not only means 
that the sovereign recognizes the existence of the norm (as the supporters of 
an independent Scotland do with respect to the treaties through which it came 
to form the UK), but also that the decision cannot, and should not, be seen as 
a moment of chaos and/or anarchy. 
The revolutionary essence of the Schmittian decision as an exceptional 
act of complete, and yet democratic, freedom and authority may therefore 
only be understood if we acknowledge that, in Kahn’s words: 
Like Heidegger’s authentic individual . . . [t]he 
sovereign is the political being characterized by [the] 
consciousness of the possibility of its own death. The 
state must first come into being; it must achieve its own 
existence, it must continue to will itself to be in the face 
of the acknowledgement of its own mortality. To flee 
from confronting the possibility of the death of the state 
is a kind of inauthenticity, to take up that knowledge is 
to achieve a kind of political authenticity.81 
This is why, as Schmitt claimed from the very beginning of his politico-
theological inquiry, “[t]he state suspends the law in the exception on the basis 
of its right to self-preservation.” 82 It is only in this way, as we shall see, that 
the interaction of the spatial (Ortung) and juridical (Ordnung) components of 
the socio- , bio- and geopolitical order takes place. 
The fact that the sovereign must act in such an exceptional way to 
preserve the existence of both the legal order and identity that express it 
explains why the norm maintains itself in relation not to the regularity of 
cases, but to the exception. Within this perspective, the conflict between 
Schmitt and Walter Benjamin provides us with the argumentative instruments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 36 (Kevin Attell trans. and ed., Univ. of 
Chicago Press 2005); Kennedy, supra note 62, at 85 (“Schmitt’s understanding of the 
relationship between legal form and decision can still be read within the boundaries 
of an established constitutional order.”) 
81 Kahn, supra note 63, at 60.  
82 Id.; Schmitt, supra note 62, at 12. See also McCormick, supra note 58, 249–289. 
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that we need in order to understand the Schmittian paradox of sovereignty, 
and in particular, why “[t]he sovereign, having the legal power to suspend the 
validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law.”83 In his 1921 
essay Critique of Violence, Benjamin tried to demonstrate that the real 
essence of a particular form of “divine” or “pure” violence (Gewalt) is 
absolutely incompatible with any possible attempt at juridical legitimation 
and/or recognition. As Agamben writes, “[W]hat the law can never tolerate . . 
. is the existence of a violence outside the law; and this is not because the 
ends of such a violence are incompatible with law, but because of its mere 
existence outside the law.”84 Consequently, according to Benjamin, the law 
cannot, and ought not to, tolerate any “state of exception” broadly understood 
– even that of “self-defense” (well-accepted today), which may eventually 
lead to so-called “justifiable homicide.” As a response, Schmitt has instead 
tried to “capture Benjamin’s idea of a pure violence and to inscribe anomie 
within the very body of the nomos.”85 That is to say, while affirming the 
sovereign act in terms of extreme political decisions, and hence trying to 
overcome the Benjaminian paradox of violence – according to which, “in 
deciding on the state of exception, the sovereign must not in some way 
include it in the juridical order.”86 And which renders the baroque sovereign 
“constitutively incapable of deciding.”87 – Schmitt identifies a place that is 
“neither external nor internal to the law [because it] is the necessary 
consequence of the attempt to neutralize pure violence and ensure the relation 




B. Introducing Schmitt’s Spatial Ontology 
It is our suggestion that both direct and indirect opt-out procedures from 
the EU entail the full realization of the concept of “space” in Schmittian 
terms. Schmitt’s spatial thinking and notion of the nomos of the earth have 
recently received much-deserved attention on both sides of the Atlantic. As 
mentioned, this is largely due to the recent translation into English of his 
major works, which must be analyzed in conjunction with the translations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Agamben, supra note 66, at 15. 
84 Agamben, supra note 80, at 53. 
85 Id. at 54. 
86 Id. at 55; see also Samuel Weber, Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin 
and Carl Schmitt 22 DIACRITICS 1, 5 (1992). 
87 Agamben, supra note 80, at 55. 
88 Id. at 54. Agamben correctly notes that, through Benjamin’s shift, “[T]he paradigm 
of the state of exception is no longer the miracle, as in Political Theology, but the 
catastrophe.” Id. at 56. 
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Agamben’s works. In this sense, although some authors deny the possibility 
of an autonomous spatial, and thus geographical, ontology in Schmittian 
terms (Elden, Chandler, Legg, and Vaseduvan),89 others (Hooker, Rasch, 
Levinson, Odysseos, Petito, and, in part, Galli) accept its existence and delve 
into it through a critical approach. 
The truth is that after completing his works on Hobbes, Schmitt turned 
to international law and relations to develop his political theology from the 
broader perspective of spatial ontology.90 Consequently, as Kam Shapiro and 
William Hooker have correctly argued,91 Schmitt’s work not only “involves a 
complex theory of political territory,” but his “bold vision of the importance 
of spatial concepts in shaping the possibility of political order’ may qualify 
him as a geopolitical thinker.” This is due to the circumstance that, shifting 
from his previous pre-war concerns, in The Nomos of the Earth,92 Schmitt 
“reinterpreted nomos, drawing upon its Greek etymology,93 as referring to 
something both more concrete, and transcendental, than the law [which is] 
constituted by three processes: [those] of appropriation, distribution and 
production.”94 In this way, Schmitt was eventually able to define his spatial 
thinking by explaining the essential role played in any legal order by the 
interaction of the spatial component (Ortung) and the juridical one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Other scholars (among whom is Rowan) think instead that radical indeterminacy is 
a constant feature in all Schmitt’s works. 
90 Mika Ojakangas correctly divides Schmitt’s thinking into three phases: 
decisionism (Weimar), movement (Nazism), and concrete-order thinking (nomos). 
See A PHILOSOPHY OF CONCRETE LIFE: CARL SCHMITT AND THE POLITICAL THOUGHT 
OF MODERNITY (Peter Lang 2006). Yet Schmitt had been interested in the essence of 
concrete-order thinking since 1934, as is clear from the content of his On the Three 
Types of Juristic Thought, supra note 2. In this sense, it should be borne in mind that, 
although they may seem the same thing, law and nomos are ontologically different. 
For a recent and compelling inquiry into this difference, of which Schmitt was well 
aware, see PIER GIUSEPPE MONATERI, I CONFINI DELLA LEGGE. SOVRANITÀ E 
GOVERNO DEL MONDO (Bollati Boringhieri 2014); id. GEOPOLITICA DEL DIRITTO. 
GENESI, GOVERNO E DISSOLUZIONE DEI CORPI POLITICI (Laterza 2013). See also 
Georgy Kantor, Ideas of Law in Hellenistic and Roman Legal Practice, in Paul 
Dresch and Hannah Skoda (eds.), supra note 65, 55–83. 
91 KAM SHAPIRO, CARL SCHMITT AND THE INTENSIFICATION OF POLITICS. 
MODERNITY AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 14, 68 (Rowman & Littlefield 2010); supra 
note 62, at 196. 
92 CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE 
JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (G. L. Ulmen trans., Telos Press Publishing 2005). 
93 The Greek term nomos is derived from the other Greek term nemein which, 
depending on the context, means “to divide,” “to pasture,” “to distribute,” or “to 
posses.” The noun nomos is therefore a nomen actionis whose action and process are 
that of nemein. On the difference between lex and nomos, see HANNAH ARENDT, THE 
HUMAN CONDITION 63 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1998); id.; ON REVOLUTION 178-86 
(Penguin 2006); ibid; Imago Veritas Falsa: For a (Post-)Schmittian Decisionist 
Theory of Law, Legal Reasoning, and Judging, 39 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 118 ( 2014). See also supra note 70. 
94 Stephen Legg & Alexander Vasudevan, Introduction: Geographies of the nomos, 
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(Ordnung). Since the sixteenth century, the nomos, Schmitt argued, has 
indeed ceased to be imagined as the objectification of the polis, and has 
begun to be theoretically conceived and practically signified as the 
structuring combination of Ordnung and Ortung. As this study tries to 
demonstrate, the socio-, bio- and geopolitical force that lies behind both 
direct and indirect forms of nonparticipation in the European integration 
process is ultimately aimed at transcending the supra-natural neutralization of 
this combination. 
In this regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to Schmitt, the 
reason why modern socio- and geopolitical scholars have come to define the 
nomos as an “original spatialization” is related to the aforementioned 
emergence of the modern European nation-state as an “exception” to the 
Holy Roman Empire. More precisely, the idea (and further perspective) from 
which the concept of the Jus Public Europaeum was examined in The Nomos 
of the Earth is that European states have to be viewed as individual units that 
stably coexist within a complex international order. Consequently, given 
Europe’s spontaneously autonomous society,95 the European state-building 
process has to be interpreted, according to Schmitt, as the artificial, 
exceptional attempt to encapsulate the local dimension of the sociology of 
law, historicity of politics, and logic of memory in a deliberative act of 
signification. The spirit of the description that Schmitt offers in 
Constitutional Theory96 of the dialectic “constitutive power-constituted 
power,” together with his account on the concept of Großraum, are 
testaments to this.97 If the above, as we think, is correct, it means that because 
EU integration is a “top-down” legitimizing political process, all direct and 
indirect opt-out schemes discussed in this contribution should be seen as an 
attempt to limit, through an exceptional constitutive act of sovereign 
freedom, the impact that this trend has over issues of national interest. 
 
1. The Constitutive Essence of the ‘Boundary’ 
We would not understand the instances which stand behind the 
conventional and unconventional forms of opt-out from the European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE. A HISTORY (Oxford University Press 1996); FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER: FROM PREHUMAN TIMES TO THE 
FRENCH REVOLUTION (2011). 
96 Schmitt, supra note 70. 
97 The Großraum is a large-scale unit of territorial unity (literally “big space”) in 
which extra-regional (raumfremde) powers may not interfere and which results from 
the unification of terms such as ‘land’, ‘people’ and “idea”; it stands in opposition to 
liberal internationalism. Importantly, the Großraum is also the device through which 
the “social identity” of a community is defined according to its (racial, religious, 
spiritual, intellectual, etc.) differentia specificam and then grouped within a common 
(both ideal and territorial) space whose boundaries delimit their ethnic membership. 
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integration which we have discussed in this contribution if we first do not 
understand that, in exercising his/her power to suspend the norm and decide 
freely on the exception to save the legal order, the Schmittian sovereign 
decides both “for and against” someone or something. The recent referendum 
in which Switzerland decided to bring back strict immigration quotas for 
Europeans by pushing the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons98 
aside is a clear example of how the Schmittian sovereign informs the opt-out 
procedures. 
In particular, the Swiss experience confirms that the sovereign’s decision 
contextualizes the aforementioned “friend/enemy” antithesis, which, 
according to Schmitt, makes politics possible.99 Indeed, for the decision to 
have concrete effects, the sovereign must also delimit the geo and biopolitical 
boundaries of his or her intervention. This is the reason why Schmitt’s claims 
on the concept of the “political” and “state of exception” cannot be 
understood fully without referring to his compelling spatial ontology. 
As previously mentioned, such an investigation requires us to deal with 
Ratzel’s biogeography and biopolitics. Indeed, while investigating the 
creation of the modern European nation-state in his Politische Geographie 
and Anthropogeographie,100 Ratzel carefully explained why the “boundary,” 
from being conventionally conceived as the periphery of the population, has 
become one of the constitutive elements of it. Practically speaking, this means 
the spatial boundary of the population may change and evolve as the 
population itself does, according to its social needs and interests. From a 
narrower legal perspective, this means that the population may use the 
boundary to distinguish itself from within, and hence from another 
population, in conflicting and yet juridical terms.101 It is helpful to unite these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The agreement was signed in 1999, along with six other agreements, and came into 
force in 2002. In a 2009 referendum, the Swiss electorate approved both the 
agreements and their two protocols. 
99 Liberalism’s utopistic belief in the perpetual inclusive capacity of negotiations 
neutralizes the ‘friend/enemy’ distinction. In Schmitt’s words:  
Just as liberalism discusses and negotiates every political detail, so it also 
wants to dissolve metaphysical truth in a discussion. The essence of 
liberalism is negotiation, a cautious half measure, in the hope that the 
definitive dispute . . . can be transformed into a parliamentary debate and 
permit the decision to be suspended forever in an everlasting discussion. 
See Schmitt, supra note 62, at 63. See also Kahn, supra note 63; id. OUT OF EDEN. 
ADAM AND EVE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 53–60 (Princeton Univ. Press 2007). 
100 Respectively, POLITISCHE GEOGRAPHIE ODER DIE GEOGRAPHIE DER STAATEN, DES 
VERKEHRS UND DES KRIEGES (Oldenbourg 1903) (1897) and ANTHROPOGEOGRAPHIE 
ODER GRUNZÜGE DER ANWENDUNG DER ERKUNDE AUF DIE GESCHICTE (Engelhorn 
1899). See also Cavalletti, supra note 71, 203–20; GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE OPEN. 
MAN AND ANIMAL (Werner Hamacher ed., Kevin Attell trans., Stanford Univ. Press 
2004). 
101 According to Rouland, the “conflict” is one of the fundamental conditions of 
human creation and evolution. See NORBERT ROULAND, LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
(Philippe G. Planel trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1994). 
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considerations with what was previously investigated regarding the 
ontological and sociopolitical turn witnessed by the concept of “population” 
and the role of the political “friend” in defining itself through the recognition 
of, and further protection from, what Schmitt would define as the “enemy,” 
the “stranger,” or the “other.” This helps illustrate why the modern notion of 
“boundary” demonstrates that “[t]he principle of nativity and the principle of 
sovereignty, which were separated in the ancienrégime . . . are . . . 
irrevocably united in the body of the ‘sovereign subject’ so that the 
foundation of the new nation-state may be [first] constituted”102 and then 
further protected. 
Hence, the sovereign’s exceptional decision territorializes bio- and 
sociopolitical and legal forms of signification within the representative space 
of the population as expressed by the ‘boundary’. This process of “spatial 
movement” (Bewegung) is aimed at creating the sense of “identity” by 
integrating what lies within the constitutive boundary of the constitutive 
boundary with what lies outside of it. Yet it is our opinion that the recent 
history of the “Europeanization of Europe” makes it evident that it would be 
an unforgivable mistake to understand the concept of “boundary” only in 
pure “geographical,” and thus, “spatial” terms. If the sovereign is the one 
who decides on the exception by suspending the norm, the free, decisive act, 
which determines the positioning of the boundary, has the capacity to frame 
the purview of the sovereign’s intervention, and not just from a geographical 
perspective. Indeed, this intervention might as well be established over 
commercial, economic, and legal issues, for instance. In this sense, the Swiss 
referendum, along with the Danish, Irish, Swedish and all other experiences 
analyzed thus far demonstrate that the sovereign’s individualization of the 
“friend” – and of the “boundaries” of his/her political action – through the 
projection of the “enemy” may not only assume several topological 
dimensions, but is a key component of the instances against the 
Europeanization trend.  
 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The aim of the above comparative and multi-disciplinary discussion is to 
reflect on the circumstance that the “occult” essence of both traditional forms 
of opt-out and particularistic, indirect schemes of non-participation in the 
Europeanization trend raise delicate questions whose reach transcends the 
limits of positivistic lines of inquiry. Our understanding of these phenomena 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Agamben, supra note 66, at 128. 
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cannot be evaluated, and eventually criticized, through conventional 
approaches of analytical jurisprudence. 
In particular, in light of what is discussed in Section II on the 
Europeanization trend as a “top-down” legitimizing political process rather 
than a “bottom-up” one, we suggest that any attempt to opt-out of the EU as a 
whole, – whether direct or indirect – or out of any of its policies and/or 
international agreements signed with non-EU members (i.e., Switzerland’s 
referendum), cannot be understood fully without the help of the Schmittian 
theory of sovereignty as a theory of exceptional suspension of the given 
universalist order of sterile, apolitical uniformity. 
As discussed, Schmitt is of the idea that the concept of the political, and 
hence politics itself, are made possible by the democratic antithesis 
“friend/enemy”: the permanent presence of the conflict lies at the origin of 
the politico-juridical order, which is ultimately achieved through the free and 
sovereign decision over the exception. Such a decision “suspends” the 
targeted norm, and hence creates “disorder,” in order to prevent the death of 
the legal system as a whole by allowing politics to do its part. Politics and 
law thus find a true and powerful zone of interaction in Schmitt’s paradoxical 
concept of sovereignty as described by Agamben. Through the lens of this 
perspective, both direct and indirect forms of opt-out from the European 
integration process may be interpreted as the exceptional attempt of the 
Schmittian sovereign to take back legal, socio-, and geopolitical power over 
issues of public concern and/or strategic interest. This is done in two steps: 
by suspending EU law, and thus the Europeanization trend, through the 
decision on the state of exception, and by drawing the boundaries and 
purview of the “friend/enemy” antithesis. 
Far from just offering a genealogical perspective, Schmitt’s political 
theology may serve as diagnosis, prognosis, and therapy for all non-
regulative and apolitical tendencies of liberal modernity. Yet to understand 
completely the utility of having a Schmittian approach to EU opt-out 
procedures, it should be borne in mind that the state of exception is the 
conflict that expresses the absolute and unique origin of the politico-juridical 
form of the true, unified Volk. The decision over this origin is what 
determines the beginning of the new political, juridical, and representative 
order. The decision over the exception thus expresses the will of the true 
sovereign to suspend the existing order and create a dimension characterized 
by “identity” and “representation.” Instances of biopolitics and political 
anthropology therefore lay at the core of such a revolutionary decision. 
Within the EU, this exceptional result of absolute yet democratic freedom 
may be achieved by directly “suspending” EU law or international 
agreements between the EU and non-EU countries (Poland, Sweden, 
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Denmark, UK, Switzerland), or by indirectly “neutralizing” its impact on the 
essence and trajectory of strategic political decisions through a procedure 
also aimed at achieving independence from the community of states regulated 
by EU law (Scotland). 
Sebastian McEvoy has correctly claimed that one day “it will be 
paradoxical to argue against the harmonization and even the unification of the 
laws around the globe: legally, here will be everywhere.”103 We suggest that 
it is precisely the dialectic between “open indeterminism and closed order,”104 
and thus the unification of the apolitical essence of Siliquini-Cinelli’s 
“Europeanization of Europe” with the lessons taught by biopolitics, political 
anthropology, and the Schmittian politico-theological paradox of sovereignty, 
that makes it evident that both direct, conventional schemes and indirect, 
alternative forms of opt-out are the sovereign’s attempt to re-establish his or 
her political, normative, and ontological right of self-affirmation and 
conservation against the global and European process aimed at his or her 
dissolution. 
Yet we are perfectly aware that our claim brings the Schmittian concepts 
of the “political,” “state of exception,” and “sovereign decision” to a level 
that has never been reached before. Indeed, as Agamben writes, according to 
Schmitt, “the functioning of the juridical order ultimately rests on an 
apparatus–the state of exception–whose purpose is to make the norm 
applicable by temporarily suspending its efficacy.”105 Hence, Schmitt has 
tried to understand and describe in politico-theological terms the functioning 
of the modern apolitical and legally neutral order from within; before the 
writing of The Nomos of the Earth, he was not concerned with the structure 
and features of the possible interaction between two or more different legal 
orders.106 
On the contrary, in our case, the Schmittian sovereign decides to 
suspend a norm, – EU law in cases of direct opt-outs; a specific international 
agreement in cases of indirect forms of secessionism – that only indirectly 
belongs to the juridical order (national law)	  which he or she tries to preserve 
through his or her political and exceptional intervention. Consequently, the 
free, decisive will of our post-Schmittian sovereign operates not only from 
within, but rather, from the outside, although his or her decisive will and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Descriptive and Purposive Categories of Comparative Law, in Monateri, supra 
note 60, at 162. 
104 Legg & Vasudevan, supra note 94, at 16. 
105 Agamben, supra note 80, at 58 (emphasis added). 
106 This, among other reasons, is why Blumenberg has defined it in terms of ‘political 
metaphysics’ rather than political theology. See HANS BLUMENBERG, THE 
LEGITIMACY OF THE MODERN AGE (Robert M. Wallace trans., MIT Press 1985). 
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activity have direct consequences also for what rests within his or her 
political domain. 
	  
